

# TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

## A POLICY FOR BERLIN

### Introduction

#### A. US Objectives

The US objectives in the Berlin crisis are:

- (1) To maintain the freedom of West Berlin;
- (2) to promote the possibilities for a broader settlement which may emerge;
- (3) to preserve the unity and cohesion of the Western Alliance;
- (4) to mobilize maximum support for the Western position among the countries of the world;
- (5) to avoid hostilities and war except as a last resort to protect free access to West Berlin and to protect the security of the city.

#### B. Soviet Intentions

It has been suggested that the Soviet intention in Berlin is to stage a contest of wills, in a total confrontation of US against USSR. The Soviet purpose is said to be determined to break the will of the US, discrediting this country, and breaking the Western Alliance. It is said that Khrushchev believes that the Allies will yield West Berlin under pressure. This analysis is too simple. It is unrealistic to suppose that the USSR entertains, in relation to Berlin, a single purpose fixed and unchanging in relation to time and circumstances. It has manifold purpose, changing in emphasis and means of implementation with the flow of events.

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Its major interests are likely to settle on some immediate and attainable ends, attainable through maneuver, bargain and bluff, as: crystalizing the status quo for East Germany; fixing East Germany's boundaries as international frontiers; and reducing the impact of the West Berlin enclave as a passage for refugees and a base for subversive activities against the bloc governments. And of course the USSR will be prepared to fire on such targets of opportunity as occasion presents.

The least we may say that Soviet intentions remain ambiguous.

### C. A Berlin Timetable

In the event the Western Powers allow the initiative to remain in the hands of the Soviets by putting aside diplomatic action to concentrate upon military reaction, it will make almost certain the negotiation and conclusion of a peace treaty between the GDR and the remainder of the Soviet Bloc.

There appears to be considerable elasticity in the Soviet timing for a peace conference regarding Germany. The aide-memoir of June 4, 1961 neither contains nor intimates a time table. Previously suggested target dates -- six to eight months after the breakup of the 1960 summit meeting; the spring of 1961 -- have come and gone. The currently advertised schedule is after the West German elections in September and the Soviet Communist Party Congress in October. While there may well be further

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delays, the Party Congress affords such a likely opportunity for launching this much heralded peace conference that we may reasonably expect it to be held in the late fall or early winter.

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One point we must say that Soviet intentions remain ambiguous.

#### C. A Berlin Riddle

In the event the Western Powers allow the initiative to remain in the hands of the Soviets by putting aside diplomatic action to concentrate upon military reaction, it will not be almost certain the negotiation and conclusion of a peace treaty between the GDR and the remainder of the Soviet bloc.

There appears to be considerable elasticity in the Soviet timing for a peace conference regarding Germany. The side-announcement of June 4, 1961 neither contains nor intimates a time table. Previously suggested target dates -- six to eight months after the breaking of the 1960 Summit meeting; the spring of 1961 -- have come and gone. The currently advertised schedule is after the West German elections in September and the Soviet Communist Party Congress in October. While there may well be further delays, the Party Congress affords such a likely opportunity for launching this much heralded peace conference that we may reasonably expect it to be held in the late fall or early winter.

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On the basis of the May 15, 1959 Soviet draft peace treaty, invitations to the conference would issue to some twenty-nine states which "participated with their armed forces in the war against Germany" including, peculiarly enough, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Chinese People's Republic, and to the Federal Republic and the "G.D.R.". Of the twenty-nine, it appears likely that only the Communist Bloc members would attend, although Finland, and to a lesser degree, Yugoslavia and India would be under considerable Soviet pressure to be present. The treaty resulting from the conference would undoubtedly follow the general lines of the 1959 draft, modified to take account of the absence of the Federal Republic. This would mean the eliminations of the clauses on military alliances (Art. 5) and withdrawal of foreign forces (Art. 30).

Ratification of the treaty by, at the latest, early spring of 1962 could be expected, and, with its coming into force, the Bolz-Zorin Agreement would lapse and the East Germans, on their and the Soviet thesis, would be in sovereign control of the access routes to Berlin and of Greater Berlin itself. The Soviets would withdraw from the Autobahn checkpoints, from the railroad control posts and from the Berlin Air Safety Center. The Soviet Military Mission at Potsdam, which has been the channel of communication on access problems, would disappear. What would happen next?

In all likelihood, nothing spectacular for the moment. If we put into effect the contingency plans which contemplate dealing with the East Germans on the Autobahn and rail routes

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Ratification of the treaty by, at the latest, early spring of 1962 could be expected, and, with its coming into force, the Bonn-Berlin agreement would lapse and the East Germans, on their own and the Soviet basis, would be in sovereign control of the access routes to Berlin, and of Greater Berlin itself. The Soviets would withdraw from the Autobahn checkpoints, from the railroad control points and from the Berlin Air Safety Center. The Soviet Military Mission at Potsdam, which has been the channel of communication on access problems, would disappear. What would happen next?

In all likelihood, nothing spectacular for the moment. If we get into effect the contingency plans which contemplate dealing with the East Germans on the 1st April and with the Soviets previously as we dealt with the Soviets, the first effect is likely to be felt in the air when the civilian



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civilian pilots, in the absence of former Soviet "guarantees of flight safety" refuse to fly the Air France, BOAC, and Pan American flights. The civilian flights, however, can be replaced by military transport flights without undue difficulty.

But, sooner or later, at one point or many, the pressure will be applied. If the East Germans are shrewd, the pressure will be applied and increased upon our access routes in such ways as to impose the onus of intractable and aggressive behavior upon the Western Powers. They will propose a conference with us to discuss the replacement of one of the Autobahn bridges. We refuse to meet with them. They begin repairs on the bridge, and, because no other arrangements have been made, refuse to allow Allied military traffic through. What do we do?

The East Germans request a conference to discuss our custom of including the Bundespost Mail as part of our military trains. We ignore the request. Mail cars are detached by the East Germans and shunted to a siding. What do we do?

The East Germans invite us to a conference to discuss a contribution towards the maintenance of the Autobahn. We don't go. They impose a 50 pfennig charge on each military vehicle. When our vehicles refuse to pay, they are not allowed through. What do we do?

Such instances could be multiplied indefinitely, but the crux of the problem remains the same. We are confronted with a situation in which the overt issue is not maintenance of the freedom of Berlin but refusal to deal with East German officials because we do not recognize the "G.D.R." as a state.

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But, sooner or later, at one point or many, the pressures will be applied. If the East Germans are shrewd, the pressure will be applied and increased upon our access routes in such ways as to impose the onus of intractable and aggressive behavior upon the Western Powers. They will propose a conference with us to discuss the replacement of one of the Antwerp bridges. We refuse to meet with them. They begin repairs on the bridge, and, because no other arrangements have been made, refuse to allow Allied military traffic through. What do we do?

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Such instances could be multiplied indefinitely, but the crux of the problem remains the same. We are confronted with a situation in which the West alone is not maintenance of the freedom of Berlin but refused to deal with East German officials because we do not recognize the "G.D.R." as a state.

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D. Requirements for a Course of Action

From their analysis of US objectives, Soviet intentions, and the likely course of events if we do nothing to stop it flow certain specifications for US and allied action:

1. It should offer promise of clarifying Soviet intentions before irrevocable commitments are made.
2. It should gain the initiative for the West. For 32 months now -- since November 1958 -- the USSR has been calling the turns and the Western Allies have been producing only responses to Soviet moves. We should not let the Soviets proceed unhindered with their announced time-table of actions, while the Western Allies merely respond with a series of military and economic preparations which do not engage the USSR in the international political arena.
3. It should keep open the possibility of new and different courses of action should circumstance of Soviet moves dictate an alteration of course. We should begin with utmost caution any moves of emergency military or military preparedness moves. A central feature and dilemma of the Berlin problem is the present and prospective inability of the Western allies to mount superior conventional forces to keep open ground access to Berlin against East German and Soviet armies. To turn back ultimately from a military course of action rather than proceed to nuclear war would maximize a Western defeat; it would throw away the advantages

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D. Recommendations for a Course of Action

From their analysis of US objectives, Soviet intentions, and the likely course of events if we do nothing to stop it flow certain specifications for US and allied action:

1. It should offer promise of clarifying Soviet intentions before irrevocable commitments are made.
2. It should gain the initiative for the West. For 12 months now -- since November 1958 -- the USSR has been calling the tune and the Western Allies have been producing only responses to Soviet moves. We should not let the Soviets proceed unhindered with their announced time-table of actions, while the Western Allies merely respond with a series of military and economic preparations which do not engage the USSR in the international political arena.
3. It should keep open the possibility of new and different courses of action should circumstances of Soviet moves dictate an alteration of course. We should reign with utmost caution any series of emergency military or military preparations moves. A central feature and dilemma of the Berlin problem is the present and prospective inability of the Western Allies to mount regular conventional forces to keep from Soviet claims to Berlin against their threat and Soviet moves. We have been ultimately from a military point of view, rather than a political one, to ensure we would not have a Western defeat; it would throw away the advantages

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and opportunities of a course embodying a major political component. It is also clear that the farther the US goes down the road of military measures the harder it will be at any point to draw back or change course. Decisions now on a series of military measures can compel other decisions later, removing a desirable and indeed essential range and freedom of choice.

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